Mechanographia

M1917 Light Tank

U.S. Production Variant of the Renault FT

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Contents

United States, 1918–1930s — Type: Light Tank
Chassis: Renault FT derivative
Main Armament: 37 mm M1916 gun or .30-cal Marlin M1917 MG
Armor: 6–22 mm (frontal and turret), 6–16 mm (hull sides/rear)
Technical Manuals: No standardized wartime TM issued; referenced postwar in TM 9-2800 (U.S. Army Ordnance Catalog)

The M1917 Light Tank was an American-made version of the French Renault FT, built under license in 1917. While maintaining the original layout and tactical purpose of the French design, the M1917 featured several mechanical and structural modifications to suit American manufacturing methods. Unfortunately, these tanks didn’t reach the battlefield before the November 1918 Armistice, and were instead used mainly for postwar training and experimental purposes.

1. Background and Development

Renault FT Origins (1916–1917)

The Renault FT 1 was designed in 1916 under the direction of General Jean-Baptiste Estienne and marked a revolutionary shift in tank design. It introduced the now-standard features of a two-man crew, a fully rotating turret, and a rear-mounted engine. These innovations defined its tactical role in close infantry support, particularly for neutralizing machine-gun nests and aiding trench assaults (Gale 2016, p. 68).

Following successful trials in early 1917, the French Army approved the FT for mass production. Between May and September 1917, France ordered 3,650 units. However, the domestic industry, strained by wartime demands and hampered by a shortage of rolled armor plate—much of which had to be sourced from Britain and the United States—was unable to meet delivery targets (Gale 2016, pp. 125–127).

U.S. Evaluation and Adaptation (1917–1918)

To address these production bottlenecks, French officials encouraged the United States to manufacture the FT under license. This proposal dovetailed with War Department planning for a tripartite tank program: (1) licensed production of the FT as the M1917, (2) indigenous development of the Ford 3-Ton, and (3) joint Anglo-American production of the Mark VIII heavy tank (Cameron 1997, p. 14). General John J. Pershing endorsed this approach in June 1917, advocating for the formation of twenty light and five heavy tank battalions, based on French and British designs respectively (Icks 1937, p. 333).

Unlike France and Britain, which developed tanks independently but within a context of mutual awareness, the United States entered the program as a late associate. While French General Estienne had received formal approval from Joffre to pursue tank development in December 1915, and British experimentation was under way by February 1915 under Churchill’s Landships Committee, American observers only began interacting with Allied tank designs in late 1917 (Greenhalgh 2000, pp. 808–809, 824).

In September 1917, one Renault FT along with its design documentation was shipped to the United States for evaluation (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 356; Icks 1937, p. 333). American Expeditionary Force (AEF) observers had already identified key modifications for the U.S. variant, including a steel firewall between engine and crew compartments, a self-starter, solid steel idler wheels, double-walled felt-lined fuel tanks, and an interchangeable mount for either a 37 mm cannon or a machine gun (Icks 1937, p. 333).

The vehicle was reverse-engineered to align with American industrial standards and imperial measurements. This process introduced dimensional deviations and technical delays, compounded by the Ordnance Department’s unfamiliarity with armored vehicle production. At one point, disputes arose over whether speedometers should read in kilometers or miles per hour (Cameron 1997, p. 14). Initially designated as the “Six-Ton Special Tractor”, the design was eventually standardized as the M1917 Light Tank.

2. Engineering and Technical Features

Prototype Development and Technical Challenges

The first American-built M1917 tank was completed in October 1918, following extensive reengineering to adapt the Renault FT design to U.S. manufacturing practices (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 357). Ten vehicles were shipped to France, but none arrived before the Armistice; the first shipment was not unloaded until 29 November 1918 (Icks 1937, p. 334; Gale 2016, p. 127; Hunnicutt 1992, pp. 17–18).

These early tanks served as pre-production pilot models, informing the final M1917 configuration. However, the program was characterized by significant technical delays, particularly in adapting French designs to American standards.

Turret Design and Dimensional Reengineering

Although the French Army provided a finalized turret design via Captain Braine, two competing American prototypes—one in Washington, the other in Dayton—were already underway. The Washington turret took over three months to fabricate before being discarded in favor of the French model (Icks 1937, p. 334).

To conform to U.S. manufacturing standards, the Renault FT was fully redrawn in imperial measurements. This introduced tooling mismatches and dimensional inconsistencies across multiple subsystems, including the turret, engine bay, and weapon mounts (Cameron 2008, pp. 7–8). The original French cast turret, impractical for U.S. production, was replaced with a standardized eight-plate riveted “omnibus” turret adopted across all M1917s (Gale 2016, p. 128; Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 356; Zaloga 1988, p. 12).

Armament Procurement and Material Issues

The M1917’s primary machine gun—the Marlin M1917—was adapted from aviation stocks and proved unsuited for tank use. Its integration was delayed by missed requisitions and unclear interdepartmental responsibility (Icks 1937, p. 334).

Armor plate production faced parallel problems: early lots failed ballistic testing against .30-caliber armor-piercing ammunition. In response, the Ordnance Department mandated individual proofing of each panel, though this policy was only enforced consistently after the Armistice (Icks 1937, p. 335). Broader issues of component production and delivery scheduling are addressed in Section 3.

American Modifications to the Renault FT Design

Estienne’s advocacy for automotive adaptability led to the adoption of features such as the 360° rotating turret and compact frame on the Renault FT, concepts mirrored in the M1917’s simplified riveted turret and dual-configuration gun mount. However, French designs prioritized agility and mass production, while American revisions emphasized industrial compatibility and ruggedization (Greenhalgh 2000, pp. 817–818).

To align with U.S. production and operational standards, the M1917 incorporated the following technical modifications:

  • Steel firewall between engine and crew compartment
  • Solid steel idler wheels (replacing Renault’s wooden-rimmed design)
  • Double-walled, felt-lined fuel tanks for improved fire safety
  • Left-side exhaust outlet adapted to U.S. layout
  • Interchangeable mount for 37 mm M1916 cannon or .30-cal Marlin MG
  • Integrated electric self-starter
  • Additional driver vision slits
  • Octagonal riveted omnibus turret (replacing French mixed cast/riveted types)

While essential, these revisions introduced cumulative engineering complications that contributed to prolonged delays in production and fielding.

3. Production and Manufacturing

Strategic Delays and International Bottlenecks

French tank output in early 1918 was hampered by material shortages and shifting political priorities. Minister of Armaments Louis Loucheur diverted key resources—such as steel and assembly space—toward the Schneider CA3 program, overriding objections from both General Estienne and General Pétain (Gale 2016, pp. 127–128). Although plans called for 1,000 Renault FTs by March, only one combat-ready vehicle was available on 21 March, and most of the 234 tanks completed that month required substantial rework.

The U.S. faced similar delays due to engineering setbacks and structural inefficiencies. The Ordnance Department aimed to deliver 1,200 M1917s by July 1918, including 100 by April, but only 209 were completed by year’s end, with none reaching combat readiness (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 357). A February cable to GHQ promised April delivery, despite the project having just twelve assigned personnel and incomplete technical drawings (Icks 1937, p. 334).

Contractors and Production Logistics

Production of the M1917 was split across three main contractors:

  • Van Dorn Iron Works (Cleveland, Ohio): Hull fabrication
  • Maxwell Motor Company (Dayton, Ohio): Final assembly
  • C.L. Best Company (Dayton, Ohio): Drivetrain components
    (Hunnicutt 1992, pp. 17–21; Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 357)

Although blueprint conversion and turret design complications had already delayed progress (see Section 2), industrial rollout was further disrupted by capacity limitations and a lack of centralized oversight.

Component Manufacturing Challenges

The U.S. industrial base struggled to meet the program’s material needs. Delays were caused by shortages of:

  • Billets and axle-grade steel
  • Coke for metallurgy
  • Rail and transport infrastructure

Each supplier required separate authorization from various government agencies—including the War Trade Board, billet mills, and steel producers—leading to uncoordinated approvals and cascading scheduling failures (Icks 1937, p. 334).

In parallel, armor plate quality control remained a persistent bottleneck. As noted in Section 2, early plate batches failed ballistic tests, necessitating panel-by-panel proofing—a labor-intensive process applied consistently only post-Armistice.

Industrial Coordination Failures

The War Department originally placed an order for 4,440 M1917 tanks, but systemic issues—fragmented interagency control, poor design integration, and mismatched production timelines—prevented even a fraction from reaching the front.

Each tank required approximately 1,200 unique parts and over 33,000 total components, placing unprecedented strain on American logistics and subcontractor management (Icks 1937, p. 334). Without a unified authority to oversee procurement, engineering, and output scheduling, the M1917 program became a case study in wartime production dysfunction.

Allied collaboration was nominal but often dysfunctional. France, struggling with resource shortages, proposed reciprocal exchanges—offering Renault FTs in return for heavier British tanks—but British authorities dismissed these suggestions, preferring to retain design and production control. Elizabeth Greenhalgh notes that “as late as June 1918, France still hoped for a meaningful tank exchange, but no operational system ever materialized” (Greenhalgh 2000, pp. 826–831).

4. Variants and Armament

Production Overview by Variant

The M1917 was produced in three main configurations, distinguished by primary armament and role. Despite the initial War Department order of 4,440 units, final production was limited to 952 tanks, with the following distribution:

VariantQuantityArmamentNotes
M1917 (Gun)37537 mm M1916 cannonSemi-automatic cannon; main combat variant
M1917 (MG)526.30 cal Marlin MGAircraft-derived MG with reliability issues
M1917 TSF50NoneTSF = Télégraphie Sans Fil (signal vehicle)

(Source: Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 357; Icks 1937, p. 334)

Armament Development and Modifications
The .30-caliber Marlin M1917 machine gun—adapted from an aviation weapon based on the Colt Model 1895—was the standard armament in the MG variant. Its gas-lever system was replaced by a straight-line piston beneath the barrel to suit armored mounts. However, this redesign altered recoil timing, leading to frequent extraction failures, particularly torn case rims. Marlin blamed cartridge quality; the Ordnance Department insisted all weapons function with standard-issue ammunition (Segel, Iannamico & Shea 2006, pp. 61, 69).

Despite objections from Ordnance officers familiar with French tank production, the Marlin was approved under Signal Corps pressure. Modification contracts at the Marlin-Rockwell plant were delayed by bureaucratic failures—many requisitions and procurement authorizations were either late or never issued (Icks 1937, p. 334).

To address recurring malfunctions, the Browning M1919 was adopted mid-production as a replacement for the Marlin. Retrofits were applied to existing tanks where possible, though only one surviving example—the vehicle at the Pennsylvania Military Museum—still retains its original Marlin mount (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 357).

Ammunition Stowage and Configuration

  • Gun tanks (37 mm M1916): 238 rounds across four racks
  • MG tanks (.30 cal Marlin): 4,200 rounds in 84 disintegrating-link belts
    (Lawrynowicz 2006, p. 9)

Secondary Features
The standardized turret—adopted after delays and redundant U.S. design attempts—was an eight-plate octagonal riveted structure. It included:

  • Three vision slits
  • One flag port
  • Standard mantlet for both cannon and machine gun mounts

Experimental Modifications
Pre-production tests explored the use of laminated glass vision blocks, but this feature was rejected for series production. Armor reliability also remained a concern; only tanks produced after the Armistice met full ballistic standards due to improved panel proofing (Icks 1937, p. 335).

Technical Modifications

Although the M1917 retained the overall layout of the Renault FT, it incorporated significant mechanical and structural modifications to meet American manufacturing standards and logistical practices.

The tank was powered by a Buda HU 4-cylinder gasoline engine, originally designed for marine use, delivering 42 horsepower at 1,460 rpm. It was coupled to a sliding gear transmission with four forward speeds and one reverse (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 356). Operating protocols issued by Buda emphasized gradual engine warm-up, avoidance of high RPMs while cold, and close monitoring of oil pressure and fan belt tension to prevent crankcase failure—procedures frequently neglected in field conditions (Buda 1917, paras. 15–18, 53–54).

The engine featured a pressurized lubrication system driven by a camshaft-mounted gear pump. Main and connecting rod bearings were fed via crankshaft galleries; piston pins relied on gravity lubrication, while the valvetrain received oil mist recirculated through return ports. A spring-loaded relief valve regulated pressure, and an internal screen with bypass prevented overpressure and contamination (Buda 1920, pp. 17–18, 55). Cooling was provided by water circulation through exhaust valve galleries, cylinders, and head—a system that prioritized heat control but required precise tappet clearances and high-grade lubricants to avoid valve failure and piston scoring (Buda 1920, p. 22).

Hull revisions included a flat glacis plate and squared rear access hatches. The turret, standardized across all production vehicles, consisted of eight riveted steel plates in an octagonal arrangement, replacing the French fleet’s mixed cast and riveted turrets (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 356). This simplification addressed the tank’s inherent complexity—each vehicle comprising over 1,200 unique components and approximately 33,000 individual parts (Icks 1937, p. 334).

Key mechanical revisions included:

  • Solid steel idler wheels replacing wooden-rimmed originals
  • Left-side exhaust outlet
  • Steel fireproof bulkhead between engine and crew compartment (Lawrynowicz 2006, p. 9)

Crew ergonomics were modestly improved by:

  • An American-pattern gun mantlet
  • Additional driver vision slits on both sides
  • An integrated electric self-starter (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 356; Lawrynowicz 2006, p. 9)

The turret retained three vision slits and a flag port. Ammunition storage comprised four racks for 238 rounds in gun tanks, or 4,200 rounds in 84 belts for machine gun variants (Lawrynowicz 2006, p. 9).

Experimental features tested during pre-production included laminated glass vision blocks, ultimately rejected for series production. Armor protection also required reworking: early plate lots failed .30-caliber armor-piercing tests, prompting the Ordnance Department to implement individual ballistic certification for all armor panels post-Armistice (Icks 1937, p. 335).

Production Delays

French tank production in early 1918 remained heavily constrained by material shortages and internal prioritization conflicts. Minister of Armaments Louis Loucheur diverted critical resources—including steel and assembly capacity—toward the Schneider CA3 program, overruling opposition from both General Estienne and General Pétain (Gale 2016, pp. 127–128). Although planners projected the delivery of 1,000 Renault FTs by March, only a single combat-ready tank was available on 21 March. Of the 234 units completed that month, most required substantial rework prior to deployment (Gale 2016, pp. 127–128).

In the United States, similar delays emerged from both engineering setbacks and structural inefficiencies. The U.S. Ordnance Department had projected delivery of 1,200 M1917 tanks by July 1918. In practice, only 209 were completed by year’s end, and none reached combat readiness (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 357). A February 1918 cable to GHQ promised delivery of 100 tanks by April, despite the fact that only twelve personnel were assigned to the project and essential design drawings remained incomplete (Icks 1937, p. 334).

As detailed in Section 2, turret redesign complications delayed standardization and forced adoption of the French-provided omnibus model.

At the industrial level, production was hampered by the inability of contractors to secure critical inputs—billets, axle-grade steel, coke, and transport infrastructure—due to the absence of unified priority access. Each supplier required independent authorization, and misalignments in approvals disrupted scheduling across the supply chain (Icks 1937, p. 334).

Turret design also had to be restructured due to French casting limitations. The original one-piece cast turret used on early Renault FTs could not be manufactured in quantity. A riveted alternative, constructed from flat armor plates and known as the “omnibus” turret, was adopted for both late-production French vehicles and all M1917 tanks (Gale 2016, p. 128; Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 356; Zaloga 1988, p. 12).

5. Operational Use

Wartime Deployment

The M1917 did not participate in combat during the First World War. Although ten vehicles were shipped to France, none were issued to frontline units. The first shipment was not unloaded until 29 November 1918, eighteen days after the Armistice (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 357; The Armourers Bench 2020).

Postwar Service (1919–1930s)
After the war, the M1917 remained in limited service with the U.S. Army and National Guard. In the absence of newer designs, it was used primarily for:

  • Training: Instructional vehicle in early tank units
  • Ceremonial appearances: Public parades and Victory Loan campaigns
  • Demonstrations: Public exhibitions and base showcases
    (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 357; Icks 1937, p. 335)

One notable public use was a Victory Loan promotional climb to the summit of Pikes Peak in 1919 (The Armourers Bench 2020). Another tank, privately owned, was operated in parades before its eventual preservation at the Pennsylvania Military Museum (Siggins & Dabney 2017, pp. 359–360).

Modernization Trials and Doctrinal Evaluation

In the late 1920s, a small number of M1917s were upgraded with Franklin air-cooled engines to test improved speed and noise reduction. These modified vehicles, designated M1917A1, were issued to experimental mechanized units for field trials (Icks 1937, p. 339; Hunnicutt 1992, pp. 25–38; Cameron 2008, p. 9).

  • Top speed: Increased to 10 mph
  • Noise: Reduced by approximately 50%
  • Designation: Also referred to as 6-Ton Tank A-1

The program was terminated in 1930 when the Chief of Infantry formally ended all support for modernization of WWI-era tank designs. The M1917 was declared obsolete, even for training purposes (Icks 1937, p. 339).

Withdrawal and Disposition

Most surviving vehicles were withdrawn and scrapped during World War II-era salvage campaigns. Only a handful survive today, preserved in museum collections as representative examples of America’s first domestically produced tank (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 354).

6. Postwar Legacy

Doctrinal Influence

Although it never saw combat, the M1917 played a foundational role in shaping American armored vehicle design and doctrine during the interwar period. Its configuration—with a rear-mounted engine, front driver compartment, and centrally positioned rotating turret—established a baseline layout adopted by virtually all subsequent U.S. and foreign light tank designs.

During the 1920s, U.S. tank battalions such as the 344th and 345th continued to operate M1917s alongside French-built Renault FTs. These units reported consistent mechanical failures, particularly:

  • Fan belt reliability: Frequent breakages, sometimes multiple per day
  • Overheating: Often caused by undetected belt failure, leading to crankcase damage
    (Zaloga 1988, p. 21)

To reduce the risk of spalling (interior fragmentation from non-penetrating hits), tank crews were issued protective face shields—a precaution rarely mentioned in standard postwar training literature (Zaloga 1988, p. 6).

Experimental Conversions

In 1930, six tanks were retrofitted with Franklin air-cooled engines, achieving:

  • Increased speed: Up to 10 mph
  • Reduced engine noise: Approximately 50% decrease
  • Designation: 6-Ton Tank A-1 (trial units)

These vehicles were assigned to the Mechanized Force at Fort Eustis for evaluation, but the program was discontinued later that year when the Chief of Infantry canceled all further modernization of WWI-era armor (Icks 1937, p. 339).

Obsolescence and Scrapping

Following the Armistice, the Tank Corps was drastically reduced, from over 20,000 men in November 1918 to just 294 by mid-1919. The National Defense Act of 1920 abolished the independent Tank Corps, integrating armor under the Chief of Infantry—a decision driven more by austerity than doctrine. Patton and Eisenhower both opposed the move, but their arguments failed to preserve the branch (Anderson 2016, p. 13).

Despite its obsolescence by the early 1920s, the M1917 remained in frontline training use through the end of the decade, primarily because no viable replacement had yet been fielded. Its continued employment gave American forces critical exposure to basic armored tactics and maintenance, laying the groundwork for future tank development in the 1930s and beyond (Icks 1937, p. 335).

7. Coalition Development and Doctrinal Divergence

Although France and Britain independently initiated tank development in 1915, their approaches to coordination with the United States and each other remained uneven throughout the war. While General Estienne emphasized secrecy and mobility, and actively sought cooperation as early as 1916, British decision-makers prioritized self-sufficiency and retained tight control over design and production pipelines (Greenhalgh 2000, pp. 809–812).

The French envisioned complementary deployment of light and heavy tanks, akin to artillery pairings, and offered to exchange Renault FTs for British Mark V types. However, these proposals were ignored by the British Ministry of Munitions. When the U.S. entered the war, it aligned with Britain to produce the Anglo-American Mark VIII “Liberty Tank,” sidelining France from the inter-allied industrial process (Greenhalgh 2000, pp. 824–826).

Despite multiple attempts—such as the 1918 Versailles Inter-Allied Tank Committee—to coordinate production and allocation, the effort faltered. Greenhalgh concludes that the factory at Châteauroux, intended as a joint manufacturing site, became an “international scandal” (Greenhalgh 2000, p. 832). While tactical-level cooperation occurred during the Hundred Days, strategic and industrial collaboration never reached its potential.

8 Camouflage and Markings

French Camouflage Patterns

Renault FT units of the French Army typically employed three-tone disruptive camouflage schemes consisting of:

  • Base colors: Sand, brown, and green
  • Dividing outlines: Black-painted borders
  • Tactical insignia: Often based on playing card suits (spade, heart, diamond, club)
  • Battalion colors: Blue (1st Bn), red (2nd Bn), yellow (3rd Bn)
    (Zaloga 1988, pp. 13–14, 44)

Although this scheme was doctrinally prescribed, it was inconsistently applied in practice due to production delays and field repainting.

American Marking Adaptations

The U.S. Army Tank Corps adopted the French battalion structure during 1918, forming six light tank battalions with identical nominal organization. Although none received M1917 tanks before the Armistice, the unit structure and marking system were retained into the early 1920s (Icks 1937, pp. 334–335).

Between 1919 and 1920, the 16th Tank Battalion at Fort George G. Meade implemented a distinct camouflage scheme on its M1917s. This pattern featured:

  • Colors: Blue, brown, and yellow-beige
  • Style: Omitted black dividing lines used by French forces
    (Siggins & Dabney 2017, pp. 357–361)

Paint Layer Preservation and Conservation Analysis

A conservation study of a surviving M1917 confirmed that approximately 85% of the original paint layer from this Fort Meade scheme remained intact. The analysis supported the historical accuracy of the unit’s unique approach and provided one of the few verified pigment records of U.S. interwar tank camouflage (Siggins & Dabney 2017, pp. 357–361).

Standardization and Repainting

By the early 1920s, most M1917s were repainted in standard olive drab and finished with a protective gloss varnish, in line with broader U.S. Army vehicle regulations. These changes marked a shift away from unit-specific patterns toward greater visual uniformity—though some ceremonial and museum-preserved tanks retained earlier schemes.

9. Surviving Vehicles

Although most M1917 tanks were scrapped during World War II salvage drives, a limited number were preserved in museum collections or private hands, offering rare physical documentation of the United States’ first domestically produced tank.

Notable Preserved Examples:

  • Pennsylvania Military Museum (Boalsburg, PA)
    One of the most complete surviving M1917s, this vehicle uniquely retains its original Marlin M1917 machine gun mount, making it a key reference for early U.S. tank armament configurations (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 357).
  • National Armor and Cavalry Collection (Fort Benning, GA)
    Holds several M1917s in various states of restoration or conservation, used for research and public display.
  • Aberdeen Proving Ground / U.S. Army Ordnance Museum (status uncertain post-relocation)
    Previously housed examples in both cannon-armed and machine gun configurations.
  • Canadian War Museum (Ottawa)
    Preserves one M1917 acquired postwar for evaluation and display.
  • Private collections (U.S. and U.K.)
    A handful of privately owned M1917s remain, including one restored example that was used in parades and exhibitions before its donation to a public institution (Siggins & Dabney 2017, p. 359).

Summary

SpecificationM1917 Light Tank
Total Production952 units
Main Variants375 (37 mm gun), 526 (MG), 50 (TSF)
PowerplantBuda HU 4-cyl gasoline engine
Armor ThicknessUp to 22 mm
Armament37 mm M1916 or .30 cal Marlin MG
Crew2 (driver, commander/gunner)
Notable ModificationsSteel bulkhead, solid steel idlers, left exhaust
Combat UseNone during WWI
Postwar UseTraining, ceremonial, technical experimentation
UpgradesM1917A1 with Franklin air-cooled engine

References

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Siggins, Michael, and Karen Dabney. “The Pennsylvania Military Museum’s Six-Ton M1917: A Unique Example of America’s First Modern Tank.” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 84, no. 3 (2017): 354–62. https://doi.org/10.5325/pennhistory.84.3.0354.

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Zaloga, Steven J. The Renault FT Light Tank. Osprey Vanguard 46. London: Osprey Publishing, 1988.