Poland (September 1939)
Fallschirmjäger units were tasked with taking a bridge across the Vistula and securing airfields located between the Vistula and Bug Rivers. They took their first casualties during this operation, although no airborne drops were conducted in Poland (Baxter 2001, 5).
Denmark (9 April 1940)
On 9 April 1940, 4./FJR 1 under Hauptmann Gericke captured the strategic Stoerstrom Bridge and Aalborg Airport without resistance from Danish forces (Baxter 2001, 5).
Norway (9–14 April 1940)
3./FJR 1, under Oberleutnant von Brandis, was assigned the capture of Stavanger-Sola airfield but encountered stiff resistance (Baxter 2001, 5). 2./FJR 1, led by Hauptmann Walther, was delayed by fog and arrived after initial landings by air-landed infantry (Baxter 2001, 5). On 14 April, 1./FJR 1 under Oberleutnant Schmidt parachuted into Gudbrandsdal to intercept British forces. After four days of heavy fighting and severe casualties, the unit surrendered when it ran out of ammunition (Baxter 2001, 5). A reformed 1./FJR 1 was later deployed in support of General Dietl near Narvik (Baxter 2001, 12).
Belgium and the Netherlands (10–13 May 1940)
The German invasion of the Low Countries was among the first large-scale uses of airborne forces seen during the Second World War. Fallschirmjäger from 7. Flieger-Division and 22. Luftlande-Division were key players in these operations, employing a combination of parachute- and glider-borne assaults to achieve tactical surprise over the flat expanse of Belgium and the Netherlands (Baxter 2001, 5; Enemy Airborne Forces, 8).
The new battle group consisted of a specially formed 500-man unit, Sturmabteilung Koch, tasked with seizing key objectives — including Fort Eben-Emael and three vital bridges over the Albert Canal. On May 10, Gruppe Granit, led by Leutnant Rudolf Witzig, landed 11 DFS 230 gliders on top of the fort, bypassing the outer defenses and neutralizing several artillery positions with the collective use of hollow charges and flamethrowers. The operation represented one of the first combat successes of the DFS 230 glider, resulting in the fort’s surrender on May 11 (Baxter 2001, 5; Enemy Airborne Forces, 33).
Meanwhile, Gruppe Beton and Gruppe Stahl held their respective bridges while failure ripped through Gruppe Eisen, who could not stop the destruction of the Canne Bridge (Baxter 2001, 5). Other air landing forces captured airstrips and bridges near Rotterdam, Moerdijk, and Dordrecht, further disrupting the defenses of the Netherlands (Baxter 2001, 15). German panzer formations were on the scene from May 12 to 13 to consolidate these early gains (Baxter 2001, 15). Kurt Student, the commander of the airborne forces, was severely wounded during the rear echelon (Baxter 2001, 5).
Despite these early successes, however, the German High Command considered airborne forces to be of limited strategic value in the later Blitzkrieg through France. Mechanized spearheads were sufficient to outflank French defenses. While rumors about Fallschirmjäger operating behind enemy lines abounded, there is no substantial proof of their having played a decisive role over the rest of the campaign (Enemy Airborne Forces, 10).
Corinth Canal – 26 April 1941
Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2 (FJR 2) would also be charged with taking the bridge over the Corinth Canal to seal the Allied withdrawal from Greece. On 26 April 1941, Pseudostorm landed at both ends of the bridge with a small assault team under Leutnant Hans Teusen, in a low-altitude operation by hundreds of parachutists dropped out of Ju 52 transports (Baxter 2001, 6; Enemy Air-Borne Forces, 11).
Initially German forces were able to remove British demolition charges. But British forces quickly counterstruck and detonated the explosives, destroying the bridge and killing many of the attackers. The area had been occupied by German forces, but the building itself was unharmed. Teusen was awarded the Knight’s Cross for his role in the action. German losses — killed 63, wounded 174 (Baxter 2001, 6; Enemy Air-Borne Forces, 11).
Crete (Operation Merkur), May 20–27, 1941
Unternehmen Merkur (Operation Mercury) of May 20, 1941, was the largest German airborne operation of the war and the tactical debut of mass vertical envelopment in contested airspace. The attack on Crete involved almost 13,000 Fallschirmjäger from 7. supported by 9,000 mountain troops from 5. Gebirgs-Division (Baxter 2001, 6; Enemy Air-Borne Forces, 10–14). More than 800 transport planes flew an estimated 35,000 air and land-based troops in a mixture of parachute and glider attacks (Enemy Air-Borne Forces, 35).
Two initial objectives were the airfields at Maleme, Heraklion (Candia), Rethymnon (Retimo), and Canea. On the first day, German troops took catastrophic losses. The airfield at Maleme was not seized, and senior officers, including General Wilhelm Süssmann (killed), General Eugen Meindl, and Major Walter Koch (both wounded), were among the early casualties (Baxter 2001, 6) The 3rd Company of the LLStR was down from 126 to only 14 men. Almost 400 out of 600 Fallschirmjäger were dead by the end of the day (Baxter 2001, 22). A Royal Navy action intercepted a naval convoy trying to bring mountain troops (Baxter 2001, 6).
Despite these setbacks and losses in initial front-echelon action estimated at 60–80 percent, German forces achieved local superiority after taking Maleme airfield, allowing reinforcements to land aerially (Enemy Air-Borne Forces, 12–14). Further operations resulted in the capture of Heraklion on May 27.
Casualties were heavy. German casualties were about 3,250 killed or missing and 3,400 wounded. Allied casualties were approximately 2,500 killed or wounded and 10,000 taken prisoner (Baxter 2001, 6). The scale of German losses caused Hitler to prohibit any future large-scale airborne operations. From then on, Fallschirmjäger were used mainly as elite ground infantry instead of strategic airborne assault troops (Baxter 2001, 6).
Gran Sasso – 12 September 1943
A combined force of Fallschirm-Lehr-Bataillon and around 40 Waffen-SS commandos under Otto Skorzeny landed in 12 DFS 230 gliders at the Gran Sasso mountain to rescue Benito Mussolini (Baxter 2001, 7). The operation met no resistance, and Mussolini was flown out in a Fieseler Storch. German propaganda heavily emphasized Skorzeny’s role in the mission (Baxter 2001, 7).
Drvar – 25 May 1944
About 60 men of SS-Fallschirmjäger-Bataillon 500 executed Operation Rösselsprung by glider and parachute in an attempt to capture Tito in Drvar. The mission failed, and Tito escaped (Baxter 2001, 21).
Ardennes – 17–20 December 1944
During the Ardennes Offensive, a Fallschirmjäger Kampfgruppe under Oberstleutnant von der Heydte parachuted north of Malmedy. Due to bad weather and inexperience, only about 10 percent of the force landed near their target area. By 20 December, von der Heydte had gathered 125–300 men but ordered the group disbanded. He was later wounded and surrendered at Monschau (Baxter 2001, 7). Other Fallschirmjäger units including 3. FJD and 5. FJD also took part in the campaign (Baxter 2001, 7).
1940–42: Germany led the way with the operational development of airborne forces, resulting in the costly, but strategically worthwhile, capture of Crete. Italian efforts were undeveloped and mostly symbolic, while Japan’s early campaigns in Southeast Asia showed both logistics ambition and tactical failings. The Battle of Crete became a key point of reference for the development of airborne doctrine the world over, shaping the future of Allied and Axis airborne planning.
Baxter, I. M. Fallschirmjäger: German Paratroopers from Glory to Defeat, 1939–1945. Edited by Tom Cockle. Color plates by Ronald Volstad. Hong Kong: Concord Publications, 2001.
Italy’s early air war contributions were marginal and mainly symbolic. The 30 April 1941 invasion of the Greek island of Cephalonia marked the first operational deployment of Italian parachutists. While Rome would declare a tactical victory, other reports indicated thousands of paratroopers dropped into the sea and drowned en route to shore (Enemy Air-Borne Forces, p. 14). Development of a significant airborne capability was limited in the Italian context, with only a handful of battalions active by 1942, based out of Tarquinia and Florence (Enemy Air-Borne Forces p. 62).
Japan had begun building airborne forces as early as 1940 in the Asia-Pacific theater, deriving specifically upon German instructors requisitioned in Formosa and mainland China (Enemy Air-Borne Forces, p. 65). The initial groundbreaking deployment came on 14 February 1942 in the assault on Palembang, a pivotal oil center found on Sumatra. About 700 to 800 Japanese paratroopers were dropped on prime targets to secure oil installations and the airfield, although the overall operation was tactically a failure; most parachutists were either killed or captured and the airdrome remained in the hands of the Dutch (Enemy Air-Borne Forces, p. 15).
A more effective follow-up is found at Koepang, Timor, 20 February 1942, where parachute components were dropped with the amphibious forces. The operation’s primary aim was successfully achieved by disrupting communications and supporting the seaborne landings (Enemy Air-Borne Forces, p. 17), although estimated numbers fluctuate widely (some sources quote 600 to 1,000 men in two days).
By the middle of 1942, Japan’s doctrine evolved to stress limited drops to support other landings instead of independent airborne offensives. Even though parachute-only operations in Akita earlier that year were deemed unreliable for independent objectives and should be integrated with glider- or sea-borne forces (Enemy Air-Borne Forces, p. 73),
War Department. Enemy Air-Borne Forces. Special Series No. 7. Washington, D.C.: Military Intelligence Service, December 2, 1942.
Leave a Reply