Battle of France

Estimated reading time: 18 minutes

10 May – 22 June 1940

Introduction

Germany’s offensive in the West, conducted between 10 May and 22 June 1940, resulted in the rapid military collapse of France and the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from continental Europe.

The campaign began with the simultaneous invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, followed by a breakthrough at Sedan that allowed German armored formations to drive westward to the Channel. Paris fell on 14 June, and the French government signed an armistice on 22 June.

German success in this campaign was achieved through rapid mechanized movement, effective combined arms coordination, and the exploitation of strategic and operational deficiencies in Allied planning (Fowler 2002; Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990; Grand 2010).

Strategic Inertia and the Long-War Doctrine (September 1939 – May 1940)

Following the German invasion of Poland, France and Britain declared war on 3 September 1939. Yet beyond a brief and largely symbolic advance into the Saar (7–16 September), no substantial Allied ground operations were undertaken. This period of inactivity on the Western Front—later known as the Drôle de guerre (“Phony War”)—reflected the strategic framework adopted by the French high command: a “long-war” doctrine predicated on positional defense, economic blockade, and reliance on British sea power (Jackson 2003, 33–35; Doughty 2014, 1–5).

The French Army remained deployed behind the Maginot Line. While nominally prepared for action, French strategy emphasized attrition over initiative. This posture was not solely military. It was shaped by interwar trauma, institutional caution, and the political fragmentation of the Third Republic. Strategic risk aversion became doctrine.

Planning during this period was marked by systemic contradictions. While the general staff retained operational control, national defense policy was constrained by internal security concerns. Fears of social unrest, communist agitation, and regime instability exerted direct influence on military deployment. As late as June 1940, over 20,000 troops—including artillery and air assets—were retained in Paris for internal policing rather than committed to the collapsing front (Blatt 1996; Grand 2010).

The Dyle Plan and Allied Strategic Misjudgment

The Dyle–Bréda Plan and the Strategic Misallocation of Forces
The French high command adopted the Dyle–Bréda Plan as the centerpiece of its forward defense strategy. The plan called for a rapid Allied advance into central Belgium, aiming to establish a continuous front along the Dyle River between Louvain and Wavre, with an extended wing reaching toward Breda in southern Holland. Politically, the operation was designed to preempt German occupation of Belgium and preserve Allied credibility with the Low Countries. Militarily, it was a calculated risk—undertaken at the expense of interior defense depth (Grand 2010; Blatt 1996).

The plan was conceived without the benefit of integrated Allied command authority. Belgian neutrality had precluded prewar coordination, and no unified operational framework existed between French, British, and Belgian forces. As a result, once the campaign began, no synchronized countermeasure could be mounted in the event of a German breakthrough elsewhere along the front (Lugand 1953).

Operationally, the Dyle–Bréda deployment overextended the Allied line. Groupe d’Armées I advanced deep into Belgium, while 7e Armée extended to Breda in the Netherlands—leaving the central sector thinly held. This forward commitment deprived France of a strategic mobile reserve and fatally weakened its ability to respond to the unexpected German thrust through the Ardennes and Meuse corridor.

German Planning and the Manstein Revision

Germany’s initial concept for Fall Gelb (Aufmarschanweisung N°1), issued in late 1939, mirrored the operational logic of 1914: a frontal advance through central Belgium by Heeresgruppe B, designed to envelop Allied forces in a sweeping movement toward the Channel coast. This plan offered few strategic surprises and was compromised on 10 January 1940, when a Luftwaffe officer carrying operational documents crashed in neutral Belgium—the so-called Mechelen incident (Frieser 2005, 58–62; Horne 1969, 186–189).

In response, Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein, then serving under Rundstedt at Army Group South, proposed a radical alternative: to shift the Schwerpunkt southward. His concept called for Heeresgruppe A to conduct a main thrust through the Ardennes, a forested and mountainous region widely regarded by French planners as inaccessible to armored formations. Once across the Meuse—particularly at Sedan—German Panzer divisions would break into the open plains of northern France and drive toward the Channel, isolating Allied forces in Belgium (Zaloga 1990; Frieser 2005).

This maneuver, ultimately endorsed by Hitler in February 1940, relied on the doctrinal rigidity of the Allies. French assumptions regarding the Ardennes, never tested under fire, led to minimal fortification of the sector and the deployment of second-line reserve units without armor or adequate anti-tank capabilities. The Germans intended to exploit this vulnerability with speed, shock, and massed armor, bypassing the strongest Allied defenses and rendering their strategic deployment irrelevant (Grand 2010).

1.4 Breakthrough and Encirclement: The Fall of the Northern Front

On 10 May 1940, the Wehrmacht launched Fall Gelb. Heeresgruppe B attacked Belgium and the Netherlands, while Heeresgruppe A, spearheaded by XIX Armeekorps (mot.) under General Heinz Guderian, began its assault through the Ardennes. On 12–13 May, German units crossed the Meuse at Sedan, overwhelming the French 55e Division d’Infanterie—an understrength, poorly trained reserve unit—under intense Luftwaffe bombardment and armored attack (Frieser 2005, 189–200; Jackson 2003; Doughty 2014).

By 20 May, the German armored thrust reached Abbeville, severing the Franco-British field armies operating in Belgium. Counteroffensives at Arras, Cambrai, and Montcornet failed due to poor inter-Allied coordination, dispersed armor, and the absence of air support. General Charles de Gaulle’s 4e DCr achieved limited disruption at Montcornet on 17 May but lacked reinforcement and strategic weight (Grand 2010).

On 24 May, Hitler issued a halt order to Panzer forces outside Dunkirk—a decision shaped by logistical caution and intra-command dynamics. This pause enabled the Allies to initiate Operation Dynamo (26 May – 4 June), during which over 340,000 troops—predominantly British—were evacuated by sea. However, most heavy equipment was abandoned. Belgium capitulated on 28 May, completing the encirclement of Allied forces in the north (Zaloga 1990; Jackson 2003; Fowler 2002).

1.5 Fall Rot and National Collapse

The Wehrmacht began Fall Rot on 5 June 1940, shifting operations south of the Somme and Aisne. Heeresgruppe B breached the Somme line and encircled French and British units at Saint-Valéry-en-Caux, where the British 51st (Highland) Division and French IX Corps surrendered by 13 June (Clark 1941, 500; Doughty 2014, 198). Simultaneous thrusts into Champagne and the Aisne destroyed the cohesion of the Fourth Army. Paris was declared an open city and occupied without resistance on 14 June (Frieser 2005, 299–304).

With no strategic reserve remaining, German forces pierced the Maginot Line from the west and east. On 16 June, Marshal Philippe Pétain replaced Paul Reynaud and requested an armistice. It was signed on 22 June in the same railway carriage used in 1918. Hostilities ceased on 25 June. A separate armistice with Italy, which had declared war on 10 June and launched a minor Alpine offensive, was signed the same day (Zaloga 1990; Fowler 2002; Jackson 2003).

1.6 Political Fragmentation and Doctrinal Incoherence

France’s collapse in 1940 cannot be attributed solely to battlefield dynamics. Strategic incoherence, interwar doctrinal stagnation, and political fragmentation undermined the Third Republic’s capacity to prosecute a modern war. Unlike in 1914, no union sacrée emerged. Civil-military distrust persisted throughout the campaign. Fear of internal unrest—especially communist insurrection—continued to influence troop deployments even during the final stages of the battle (Blatt 1996; Grand 2010).

The decision to seek an armistice was not merely a military concession. It reflected a broader loss of national cohesion, administrative paralysis, and the perceived necessity to avoid internal collapse in the face of external defeat.

II. Fall Gelb: Invasion and Encirclement (10–24 May 1940)

10 May 1940 – German Offensive Begins

At 03:30 on 10 May 1940, the Wehrmacht initiated Fall Gelb with a coordinated multi-front assault against Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The offensive combined ground thrusts with targeted Luftwaffe bombardments designed to paralyze communications and disrupt Allied reaction time. German formations crossed the frontier in force within hours, initiating combat operations along a 300 km front (Fowler 2002; Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 33).

Simultaneously, elite Fallschirmjäger units executed a vertical envelopment by seizing Fort Eben-Emael, a key Belgian fortification defending the Albert Canal. The success of this airborne operation enabled rapid ground movement by Heeresgruppe B through eastern Belgium (Fowler 2002; Zaloga 1990, 33–34; Horne 1969, 198).

12–13 May 1940 – Breakthrough at Sedan

While Allied forces executed the Dyle Plan and deployed forward into central Belgium, the true Schwerpunkt lay farther south. Heeresgruppe A, under Generaloberst von Rundstedt and led operationally by Panzergruppe Kleist, advanced through the Ardennes Forest, a sector long considered by the French high command to be unsuitable for armored warfare.

Between 12 and 13 May, XIX Armeekorps (mot.), commanded by General Heinz Guderian, reached the Meuse River near Sedan. Supported by intensive Luftwaffe Sturzkampfgeschwader (dive bomber) strikes, the German assault overwhelmed the defending 55e Division d’Infanterie, which was composed largely of poorly trained and inadequately equipped reservists. The combination of psychological shock, airpower, and armored momentum shattered French cohesion and opened a 50 km-wide breach in the front (Frieser 2005, 189–200; Jackson 2003; Doughty 2014, 165–171; Zaloga 1990, 42–47).

2.2 Operational Collapse and Failed Counterblows

By 15 May, the integrity of the French center had disintegrated. In an attempt to reestablish cohesion, Prime Minister Paul Reynaud dismissed General Maurice Gamelin and appointed General Maxime Weygand (Jackson 2003, 63). However, the German advance continued with speed and precision. On 20 May, armored spearheads reached the Channel at Abbeville, severing Allied forces deployed in Belgium and northeastern France.

Allied counterattacks—including the Battle of Hannut, the Arras thrust by British and French elements, and de Gaulle’s limited offensive at Montcornet—achieved local disruption but failed to alter the operational picture. De Gaulle’s 4e Division Cuirassée de Réserve temporarily dislocated elements of the German flank on 17 May, but the attack lacked coordination, depth, and air support (Fowler 2002; Grand 2010). The encirclement of the Allied northern armies was complete.

2.3 Dunkirk: Pause and Evacuation

On 24 May, Adolf Hitler issued a controversial halt order, restraining armored formations approaching Dunkirk. The decision, influenced by terrain concerns and interservice rivalry, allowed German infantry and artillery units to close in while temporarily sparing British and French defenders. Between 26 May and 4 June, Operation Dynamo evacuated over 330,000 Allied troops, primarily British, but with significant French elements. Nearly all heavy equipment and transport assets were abandoned. Belgium capitulated on 28 May, removing the last organized Allied force in the northern sector (Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990; Grand 2010).

2.4 German Operational Culture and Method

The 1940 campaign has often been mischaracterized as the execution of a coherent Blitzkrieg doctrine. However, as Frieser and others have emphasized, no such formal doctrine existed in German military planning. The operational method represented a flexible exploitation of strategic opportunity, grounded in decentralized command structures, rapid coordination, and the interwar military reforms of the Reichswehr (Frieser 2015; Vaïsse in Lopez & Wieviorka 2015; Grand 2010).

German corps- and division-level commanders operated under Auftragstaktik, exercising tactical autonomy to exploit gaps as they developed. Panzer divisions functioned as integrated combined-arms formations, pairing armor, motorized infantry, engineers, reconnaissance elements, and direct air support. At Sedan, this system enabled rapid crossings, exploitation, and breakout before French high command could react or reinforce (Frieser 2015; Zaloga 1990).

2.5 Allied Organizational Asymmetries

The French Army was not materially inferior. The Armée de Terre deployed roughly 4,000 tanks, many superior in armor and firepower to the 2,500 German panzers. The Armée de l’Air fielded over 3,200 aircraft, nearly matching the Luftwaffe’s 4,000. Yet Allied mechanized forces were doctrinally fragmented and operationally subordinated to infantry corps without autonomy. French armored units were dispersed in small packets, commanded by officers with minimal mechanized warfare experience, and often composed of partially trained reservists (Grand 2010).

Air-ground coordination was virtually nonexistent. French and British forces lacked a shared doctrine for tactical aviation. Commanders in the field frequently operated without accurate maps, centralized intelligence, or reliable communications—whereas German formations advanced using civilian Michelin maps with greater initiative and responsiveness (Grand 2010).

2.6 Internal Constraints and Human Cost

Political anxieties further undermined French military coherence. During the critical Dunkirk–Lille operations, General Weygand withheld over 20,000 personnel, including artillery and aviation units, in Paris to guard against feared domestic unrest. These formations remained unavailable during the final defensive battles of northern France (Grand 2010).

Although German maneuver success was striking, it came at cost. Wehrmacht losses in the western campaign totaled approximately 100,000, including 40,000 killed or missing—an average of 1,000 fatalities per day. The 1940 campaign was not a bloodless demonstration of tactical genius, but a high-intensity mechanized operation characterized by sustained pressure, decisive mobility, and concentrated firepower (Richardot 2010).

2.7 Historical Comparison and Strategic Continuity

Strategically, the 1940 campaign represented a successful revision of the failed Schlieffen Plan of 1914. Instead of rigid timetables and uncoordinated flanks, the German offensive combined mechanized penetration, adaptive command structures, and prearranged diplomatic framing. Commanders like Guderian and Kleist executed a campaign model that reflected the post-1918 operational theories of the German General Staff—emphasizing tempo, envelopment, and the integration of arms at every level (X. 1941; Frieser 2015).

The victory in France, while not doctrinally preordained, validated a military culture of initiative, rather than strict adherence to a singular concept. It revealed, above all, the consequences of institutional inertia and doctrinal inflexibility in the face of evolving operational requirements.

Chronology of Operations, May–June 1940

10 May 1940 (03:30)
Germany initiates operations against Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg with coordinated air and ground assaults. Frontier defenses are penetrated within hours (Fowler 2002; Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 33).

10 May 1940
Fallschirmjäger (paratrooper) units capture Fort Eben-Emael, neutralizing a key Belgian strongpoint and facilitating rapid German movement through eastern Belgium (Fowler 2002; Zaloga 1990, 33–34).

12–13 May 1940
XIX Armeekorps (mot.), under General Guderian, crosses the Meuse near Sedan with support from Luftwaffe Sturzkampfgeschwader. French defenses collapse under concentrated firepower and operational surprise (Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 42–47).

15 May 1940
French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud dismisses General Maurice Gamelin and appoints General Maxime Weygand as Commander-in-Chief in an effort to restore operational coherence (Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 63).

20 May 1940
Elements of Panzergruppe Kleist reach the Channel coast near Abbeville, cutting off Allied forces in Belgium and northern France (Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 51).

21–22 May 1940
Allied counterattacks, including the Franco-British action at Arras, fail to break through German spearheads due to poor coordination and lack of concentrated armor (Zaloga 1990, 53–55).

24 May 1940
A halt order is issued to German armored units near Dunkirk. The decision, influenced by strategic caution and logistical concerns, allows Allied forces time to organize evacuation (Fowler 2002; Zaloga 1990, 60).

26 May – 4 June 1940
Operation Dynamo evacuates over 330,000 Allied troops from Dunkirk. Heavy equipment and vehicles are abandoned under constant Luftwaffe air attacks (Fowler 2002; Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 60–62).

28 May 1940
Belgium surrenders. The German advance continues into northern France with reduced resistance (Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 60).

Operation Fall Rot: the Second Phase of the Campaign (5–25 June 1940)

On 5 June 1940, the Wehrmacht initiated Fall Rot, the second phase of the campaign in France, with an assault along the Somme front. Heeresgruppe B, under Generaloberst von Bock, attacked between Bourg and the English Channel. German mechanized forces struck in two main sectors: one armored column crossed the Somme west of Amiens, the other attacked south of Péronne against the French Seventh Army (Clark 1941, 499).

The first breakthrough was achieved near Quesnoy. On 6 June, armored units advanced rapidly, overcoming resistance and reaching the outskirts of Rouen by the evening of 9 June. That night, they pivoted northwest and reached the Channel coast near Veulettes on 10 June, completing the encirclement of the French Tenth Army’s left wing. The forces surrounded near Saint-Valéry-en-Caux, including elements of the French IX Corps and the British 51st Infantry Division, capitulated around 13 June (Clark 1941, 500).

Simultaneously, a second armored assault breached the defenses south of Péronne on 6 June, forcing the Seventh Army to fall back through Montdidier and Noyon. The withdrawal toward the Oise–Aisne line was conducted under air attack and pressure from German mobile formations. Losses included abandoned anti-tank weapons, supply trains, and critical bridging equipment, as German units seized crossings or destroyed bridges before retreating French elements could secure them (Clark 1941, 500).

By 9 June, German forces extended their offensive eastward across the Aisne. Heeresgruppe A, including the corps of Generals Guderian and von Kleist, launched the main effort against the French Fourth Army in Champagne. Initial crossings at Château-Porcien established a bridgehead under cover of artillery and Stuka attacks, despite strong French resistance and difficult terrain. General Requin, commanding the Fourth Army, attempted a counterattack with reorganized armored forces including the 3rd Armored and 7th Light Mechanized Divisions. However, delays and insufficient air support blunted the effort. On 10 June, German armor overwhelmed French artillery positions, advancing on the Retourne River and toward Reims (Clark 1941, 501).

By 12 June, the German breakthrough at Reims–Châlons shattered the Fourth Army. French formations were cut off or destroyed piecemeal. The remnants of the XXIII Corps reached the south bank of the Marne; the VIII Corps was reduced to its headquarters and scattered units. That day marked the end of organized resistance by the Fourth Army (Clark 1941, 501).

From 13 June onward, the campaign devolved into rapid pursuit. German armored units crossed the Seine, reached Paris (occupied on 14 June), and swept southeast toward Belfort. Penetrations of the Maginot Line occurred in two sectors: the Saar front on 14 June and the Colmar sector on 15 June. These attacks, combined with the exploitation from the west, divided the Second Group of Armies and neutralized the fortified line. Simultaneously, thrusts toward the Loire at Saumur and Angers isolated remaining French forces in Brittany and central France (Clark 1941, 502).

The final resistance by the fragmented French armies took the form of isolated strongpoints and improvised defenses along the Allier and Loire Rivers. According to General Requin, the fighting in these sectors resembled guerilla warfare more than coordinated military operations. The armistice was requested on 17 June and signed on 22 June; hostilities officially ceased at 01:35 on 25 June 1940 (Clark 1941, 502–503)

5 June 1940
Operation Fall Rot begins. German forces strike south across the Somme and Aisne, encountering depleted and disorganized French resistance (Fowler 2002; Zaloga 1990, 71–72).

9 June 1940
German units breach French defensive positions along the Somme. Organized resistance begins to disintegrate (Zaloga 1990, 72).

10 June 1940
Italy declares war on France and the United Kingdom. French authorities evacuate Paris, which is declared an open city (Fowler 2002; Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 73).

12–13 June 1940
General Weygand requests an armistice. The final joint Anglo-French war council convenes at Tours, confirming the strategic disintegration of Allied cooperation (Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 73).

14 June 1940
German forces occupy Paris without opposition. The French government and military command relocate to Bordeaux (Fowler 2002; Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 73).

16 June 1940
Marshal Philippe Pétain replaces Reynaud as head of government and immediately begins seeking terms with Germany (Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 74).

17 June 1940
Pétain addresses the French nation via radio, stating that hostilities must cease (Zaloga 1990, 74).

22 June 1940
The Franco-German armistice is signed at Rethondes near Compiègne. Northern France enters German occupation, while the south is placed under Vichy administration (Fowler 2002; Jackson 2003; Zaloga 1990, 74).

Sources

Annotated Bibliography – Fall of France (Mechanographia Edition)

Clark, Alan. The Fall of France: 1940. London: Cassell, 1961.
• Used in: Section I (1.5), for the encirclement at Saint-Valéry-en-Caux.
• Comment: A vivid Cold War-era narrative, shaped by British archival access and firsthand interviews. Still useful for tactical episodes, though superseded by later operational studies.
• Access: Hard to find online; available via Internet Archive, major university libraries, or AbeBooks.

Doughty, Robert A. The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985.
• Used in: Section I (1.1, 1.2, 1.6); Section II (2.1).
• Comment: The definitive Anglo-American study of interwar French military doctrine. Deeply researched and influential, though criticized by Kiesling for underestimating structural constraints.
• Access: Widely cited; available via JSTOR, ProQuest, or used print copies online.

Fowler, Will. Blitzkrieg, Vol. 2: France, Holland and Belgium, 1940–1941. Hersham, UK: Ian Allan Publishing, 2002.
• Used in: Section I (1.4, 1.5); Section II (2.2).
• Comment: Illustrated campaign summary written for general readers. Tactical details are useful but should be cross-checked with primary-source-based monographs.
• Access: Print only; ISBN 9780711029262. Often available through military book dealers.

Frieser, Karl-Heinz. “The War in the West, 1939–1940: An Unplanned Blitzkrieg.” In The Cambridge History of the Second World War, edited by John Ferris and Evan Mawdsley, translated by Harvey L. Mendelsohn, 287–312. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
• Used in: Section I (1.2); Section II (2.1, 2.4, 2.7).
• Comment: Synthesizes Frieser’s landmark Blitzkrieg-Legende (2005). Essential for understanding why German success was opportunistic, not doctrinally programmed.
• Access: Cambridge Histories Online. Subscription or institutional access required.

Grand, Philippe. La campagne de 1940. Paris: Éditions Complexe, 2010.
• Used in: Section I (1.3, 1.4, 1.6); Section II (2.2–2.6).
• Comment: A leading French-language synthesis. Balanced and well documented. Particularly strong on command culture and the Dunkirk–Lille phase.
• Access: Print only (ISBN 9782870279337); often available through French university libraries.

Horne, Alistair. To Lose a Battle: France 1940. London: Macmillan, 1969.
• Used in: Section I (1.2); Section II (2.1).
• Comment: A classic Anglophone narrative history with journalistic style. Less analytical than later works, but still valuable for capturing contemporary atmosphere and command decisions.
• Access: Internet Archive (registration required).

Jackson, Julian. The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
• Used in: Sections I and II throughout — core source.
• Comment: The most widely respected English-language overview. Integrates political, diplomatic, and operational history with clarity and depth.
• Access: Oxford Academic, institutional access required; widely available in print.

Lugand, Lieutenant-Colonel. “La couverture stratégique et la manœuvre de 1940.” Revue militaire française, no. 53 (1953): 211–230.
• Used in: Section I (1.3).
• Comment: A valuable postwar French officer analysis. While partisan, it remains one of the few detailed primary commentaries on Allied deployment plans from a command perspective.
• Access: French military archives; digitized in select repositories (e.g., BnF Gallica or SHD Vincennes, upon request).

Richardot, Jacques. La campagne de France jour après jour. Paris: Lavauzelle, 2010.
• Used in: Section II (2.6).
• Comment: Compact operational chronology with unit-level detail. Often used in conjunction with Grand and Frieser for cross-verification.
• Access: Available in French defense collections and online secondhand (ISBN 9782702506110).

Vaïsse, Maurice. “La défaite de 1940 était inéluctable.” In Les mythes de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, edited by Jean Lopez and Olivier Wieviorka, 45–55. Paris: Perrin, 2015.
• Used in: Section II (2.4).
• Comment: Historiographical commentary from one of France’s senior diplomatic historians. Challenges deterministic narratives and contextualizes strategic decisions.
• Access: Available in paperback or eBook. Publisher link (Perrin).

X. “L’enseignement stratégique des opérations de 1940.” Revue d’histoire militaire 2 (1941): 112–134.
• Used in: Section I (1.4); Section II (2.7).
• Comment: Anonymous but authoritative early assessment, likely authored by a senior French staff officer. Provides valuable insight into strategic comparisons between 1914 and 1940.
• Access: Rare. May be found in SHD Vincennes archives or reprinted in select 1940s doctrinal anthologies.

Zaloga, Steven J. France 1940: Blitzkrieg in the West. Osprey Campaign 003. London: Osprey Publishing, 1990.
• Used in: Sections I and II (overview, maps, visual breakdowns).
• Comment: Accessible and well-illustrated campaign summary. Best used as a tactical primer and visual reference, not for deep analysis.